Journal of Food Security. 2019, 7(1), 20-27
DOI: 10.12691/JFS-7-1-4
Original Research

Effects of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria on Cropland Area

Glen Gibson1,

1Institute for Environmental and Spatial Analysis, University of North Georgia, Dahlonega, Georgia, USA

Pub. Date: February 04, 2019

Cite this paper

Glen Gibson. Effects of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria on Cropland Area. Journal of Food Security. 2019; 7(1):20-27. doi: 10.12691/JFS-7-1-4

Abstract

Land cover data derived from satellite remote sensing was used to determine if there was a significant change in cropland area in territory once controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) compared to periods before the rise of ISIS. Results revealed that mean cropland area was largest during the pre-drought period (2000-2005) at 21,707 km2, decreased during the drought period (2006-2010) to 17,119 km2, and remained at about drought levels during a period of instability in both Iraq and Syria (2011-2013) and the Islamic State period (2014-2017), 17,530 km2 and 17,335 km2, respectively. Cropland area never returned to previous highs of the pre-drought period in ISIS territory but did return to previous highs in non-ISIS territory. Results of Analysis of Variance indicate that the effects of ISIS on cropland area were similar to devastating drought.

Keywords

land cover change, Islamic state, cropland, remote sensing, Iraq, Syria

Copyright

Creative CommonsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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